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The CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI) programme was a central 
component of the first phase of the ‘war on terror’, from 2001-2008. Through 
constructing a global network of secret prisons, wherein hundreds of terror 
suspects were tortured, the US and its allies embarked upon a concerted campaign 
of state terrorism in pursuit of their wider political goals. This chapter provides an 
account of the employment of state terror through the CIA’s RDI programme. We 
outline the main features of the programme, and the involvement of a range of 
other states, many of which were Western democracies. We also show that the 
attempt to secure valuable intelligence through coercion, torture and terror proved 
to be a clear failure, resulting in the detention and torture of dozens of individuals 
who posed no threat and the use of barbaric methods which did nothing but 




In the years after the declaration of the ‘war on terror’ in September 2001, the United States 
government led the way in constructing a global system of detention outside the law, illegal prisoner 
transfers between states (rendition), and interrogation and detainee treatment practices that were 
cruel, inhuman and degrading, and that in some cases involved torture. This was, we will argue, the 
latest manifestation of the use by Western states of state terror in pursuit of their strategic goals, in 
this case the elimination of the threat posed to Western interests by radical Islamist groups with 
global reach (See Chapter 17 for a fuller discussion of Western state terrorism). 
 
Our aim in this chapter is to outline the findings from our ongoing work to uncover, map and 
understand the establishment and evolution of the CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI) 
programme. This is based on our work on The Rendition Project (www.therenditionproject.org.uk), 
established in 2011 with the aim of developing an understanding of the scope, reach and workings of 
the RDI programme. Working closely with a range of NGOs, lawyers and investigators, we have 
gathered an enormous amount of data which has enabled us to identify which countries were 
involved in the programme, what their role was, and how the programme evolved. We have been 
able to provide convincing evidence of the ill-treatment to which prisoners were subjected, and 
show the terrorising effects this has had. Here, we will set out the main features of the global 
torture programme, as well as examine the roles played by specific states. We illustrate this with a 
more detailed look at the involvement of the United Kingdom.  
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As well we making an important contribution to understandings of rendition, our work challenges 
arguments made by some terrorism experts that while undesirable, sometimes human rights 
violations including torture are necessary for curtailing the terrorist threat. We show that the 
evidence from the rendition programme presents a strong challenge to this assumption. Finally, we 
offer some insights into how critical work into secret programmes involving state terrorism might be 
investigated, specifically through collaboration with non-academics working to investigate human 
rights abuses and litigate on behalf of victims. This may provide a model for other critical scholars 
seeking to carry out research on various forms of state terrorism.  
 
The Contours of the CIA’s Torture Programme 
 
The decision by the United States government to operate outside the law in the ‘war on terror’ was 
deliberate, and almost immediate. Less than a week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on 17 
September 2001, President Bush authorised the Director of the CIA to engage in ‘clandestine 
intelligence activity’ as part of the counterterrorism campaign, including the formation of a ‘terrorist 
detention and interrogation program’. Less than two months later, on 13 November 2001, President 
Bush issued an Executive Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism (Bush 2001), providing the Pentagon with the authority to 
detain indefinitely any non-American in the world, in any place in the world, considered to pose a 
terrorist threat to US interests. Furthermore, within just three months of the second Executive 
Order, on 7 February 2002, President Bush issued a memo to his senior staff declaring that members 
of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were 'unlawful combatants' (Bush 2002), and as such did not qualify as 
'prisoners of war' under the Geneva Conventions when detained. As well as denying prisoner of war 
status to the ‘war on terror’ detainees, Bush determined that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, thus denying their protection under 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
 
This policy laid the foundations of the CIA torture programme, as well as the official military 
detentions in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In turn, the CIA programme provided the 
overarching framework for the establishment and operation of a secret prison network, which 
operated at numerous locations across four continents, and encompassed the detention of at least 
119 terror suspects between 2001-2008 (SSCI 2014). The secret detention of terror suspects took 
place within a complex ‘network’ of prisons. At its core was a set of US-run facilities, overseen by the 
Pentagon and CIA. These existed in several locations around the globe, including Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Thailand, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Cuba (alongside the official prison at Guantánamo Bay). 
Supplementing these were a series of pre-existing detention sites, centred in North Africa and the 
Middle East, which were run by foreign security forces known to regularly use torture, but to which 
the CIA had direct access. 
 
The CIA’s torture programme was made possible by using a number of small, private aircraft to 
transfer terror suspects around the world so that they could be held undetected, for the purposes of 
interrogation, using torture. The use of multiple aircraft and dozens of prison sites was deliberately 
intended to keep the programme under wraps. The use of these aircraft though, would eventually 
result in the unravelling of the entire programme. As details of the RDI programme began to emerge 
in 2004 and 2005, the importance of these aircraft became clearer, and investigators began to track 
their movements (AI 2006; Grey 2004). At the heart of the programme was a complex contracting 
network involving a number of companies which either did not exist or else had been hired to 
facilitate rendition operations. For example, some aircraft were owned by the CIA via a shifting array 
of shell companies such as Stevens Express, Premier Executive Transport, Rapid Air Transport, Path 
Corporation or Aviation Specialties. These companies were the registered owners of the aircraft, but 
only existed on paper as a front for the CIA. They were regularly dissolved, with the aircraft ‘sold’ to 
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other shell companies and often reregistered with new tail numbers along the way to cover tracks. 
Meanwhile, the aircraft themselves were operated by a set of real companies, responsible for 
maintenance, providing hangers, and arranging the logistical details for each flight circuit. Many of 
these operating companies, such as Aero Contractors, Pegasus Technologies and Tepper Aviation, 
have been reported as having very close links to, or even working exclusively for, the CIA (Weissman 
2012; Scott et al 2005). Other companies appearing in the data strings, such as Jeppesen 
International Trip Planning/Jeppesen Dataplan and Universal Weather and Aviation, were companies 
providing so-called trip planning services to a range of corporate and government clients. These 
companies were responsible for ensuring that the required flight plans were filed, overflight and 
landing authorisations received and hotel reservations booked. Meanwhile, corporate documents 
analysed by the authors reveal a parallel contracting network. At the top was the ‘prime contractor’, 
first DynCorp Systems and Solutions, LLC, and later Computer Sciences Corporation. These 
companies undertook to organise flight operations on behalf of the US government. They 
subcontracted to two brokering companies – Capital Aviation and SportsFlight – which in turn 
contracted with more than a dozen aircraft operating companies to secure the services of particular 
aircraft and the logistics required to mount global, multiday trips (for more details on the 
contribution that our work has made to the uncovering of the programme, see Raphael et al 2015).  
 
The programme was deliberately intended as an instrument for secretly extracting intelligence from 
prisoners, as well as holding them incommunicado for months or years on end. While the primary 
aim of the rendition programme was to extract intelligence, the entire process was underpinned by 
a strategy to terrorise and dehumanise the prisoners, and in so doing, intimidate others connected 
to them, whether within or outside the CIA’s secret prison network. CIA torture was, to a certain 
extent, authorised through a set of official memoranda drawn up by the US Department of Justice. 
These memos were couched in the language of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ (EITs); a 
euphemism for what was in fact a series of aggressive techniques which most experts consider to fall 
within the definition of torture. The CIA was authorised to subject prisoners to beatings, nudity, 
sleep deprivation, sensory overload and deprivation, water dousing, confinement in extremely small 
boxes, and simulated drowning (waterboarding). Official investigations by the CIA’s Inspector 
General, and by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, have revealed that a whole set of 
unauthorised torture techniques were also used, including mock executions, ice baths to induce 
hypothermia, power drills, and rape through rectal feeding without medical necessity (OIG 2004; 
SSCI 2014). 
 
Many other states were directly involved or indirectly complicit in the RDI programme. There is 
evidence, for example, that states which hosted US-run secret prisons – such as Poland, Romania 
and Lithuania – knew about what was going on, and provided key logistical assistance and diplomatic 
cover to facilitate operations. The Polish site consisted of two buildings within a military intelligence 
training base, located in the woods outside the village of Stare Kiejkuty in the lakes region of north-
eastern Poland. Recent reports suggest that the CIA paid its Polish counterparts $15 million in cash 
for the use of the site, and at least $300,000 for improvements at the site (including the installation 
of security cameras and the conversion of the two-storey villa and adjacent shed) (Goldman 2014). 
The location and layout of the Romanian site, code-named ‘Bright Light’, were revealed in December 
2011 by journalists working for Associated Press and the German ARD news programme Panorama. 
The team confirmed that they had spoken to ‘former US intelligence officials familiar with the 
location and inner working of the prison’ and that the site was located in the basement of a building 
in northern Bucharest used by the National Registry Office for Classified Information (ORNISS) to 
store sensitive EU and NATO files. The basement was, according to one senior ORNISS official, ‘one 
of the most secure rooms in all of Romania’ (Goldman and Apuzzo 2014). Lithuania, meanwhile, 
hosted two sites on behalf of the CIA: Project No. 1, a single-storied detached building in the centre 
of Vilnius; and Project No. 2, a larger facility housed at a former horse riding school in the village of 
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Antaviliai, on the edge of woodland 15 miles from Vilnius (CSND 2009). According to ABC News, 
citing unnamed Lithuanian and US officials, the CIA ‘built a thick concrete wall inside the riding area. 
Behind the wall, it built what one Lithuanian source called “a building within a building.” On a series 
of thick concrete pads, it installed what a source called “prefabricated pods” to house prisoners, 
each separated from the other by five or six feet. Each pod included a shower, a bed, and a toilet. 
Separate cells were constructed for interrogations’ (Cole and Ross 2009). In each case, pre-existing 
buildings were adapted to provide bespoke detention facilities suitable for housing a relatively small 
number of prisoners, and local security forces and private contractors were involved in the 
construction of the sites (Johnston and Mazzetti 2009; Day 2012). 
 
Other states played a key role in the capture of individual detainees, and their transfer to US forces 
for rendition, secret detention and abuse. These states included Canada, Italy, Macedonia, Sweden, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Sudan, Mauritania, The Gambia, Djibouti, Dubai, Yemen, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and, most importantly, Pakistan. States across the Middle East and North Africa 
– including Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco – have received, detained and interrogated 
suspects on behalf of the US. Some Western states have also played a key role, albeit often from an 
‘arms-length’ position. Dozens of states have been used as refuelling and logistical stop-off points for 
aircraft undertaking rendition operations, turning a blind eye as torture flights criss-crossed the 
globe. Security forces from Canada, Sweden and Italy have facilitated the capture and transfer of 
terror suspects into the system of secret detention and torture. This has been either through 
involvement in the initial ‘arrest’ and handover to US forces, or through the passing of intelligence to 
friendly security forces to locate suspects and facilitate their capture. Canadian intelligence agencies, 
along with their German and Australian counterparts, have also been accused of direct involvement 
in the interrogation of suspects in secret prisons, or else being complicit in their mistreatment 
through sending questions for interrogators and receiving intelligence derived from torture (EP 
2007; PACE 2006; UN 2010). It was the UK intelligence agencies, however, which appear more than 
any others to have been working hand-in-hand with the CIA as it operated outside the law. As such, 
we will outline the involvement of the UK in some more detail in the next section.  
 
The UK’s role in the CIA’s RDI programme 
 
UK authorities were not formally confronted with allegations of complicity in the CIA’s global torture 
programme until 2005, when evidence first emerged that UK airports had been stop-off points for a 
series of rendition operations. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw appeared before the Commons 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 13 December 2005 and stated, ‘We know of no occasion where 
there has been a rendition through UK territory, or indeed over UK territory, nor do we have any 
reason to believe that such flights have taken place without our knowledge’ (UK House of Commons 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs 2005). He further stated, ‘Unless we all start to believe in 
conspiracy theories and that the officials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is some 
kind of secret state which is in league with some dark forces in the United States, and also let me 
say, we believe that Secretary Rice is lying, there simply is no truth in the claims that the United 
Kingdom has been involved in rendition full stop, because we have not been’. Yet, through the 
dogged investigative work of a small number of NGOS, journalists, legal teams and academics, it has 
since been revealed that the UK had quietly been providing crucial logistical support to the RDI 
programme from the beginning.  
 
The UK intelligence and security agencies played a key role in ensuring that individuals considered a 
threat to national security were identified, located and apprehended by the CIA, and disappeared 
into the network of secret prisons. In one example, Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna were held and 
tortured within the CIA secret detention programme after MI5 provided details to the CIA of their 
whereabouts and travel plans. In another example, MI6 provided the intelligence necessary to 
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locate, capture and render Libyan dissidents and their families to Gaddafi’s Libya, where they were 
subsequently tortured. Abdel Hakim Belhadj (also known as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq) and his pregnant 
wife, Fatima Bouchar, were rendered to Libya in early March 2004. Documents found in Tripoli after 
the fall of Gaddafi outline the role played by MI6, which first located Belhadj and arranged with the 
Libyan and American intelligence services to render Belhadj and Bouchar back to Libya. Among the 
documents found was a fax by MI6 to the Head of Libyan International Relations Department, 
informing them of Belhadj’s detention (MI6 2004a). Whilst the CIA took the lead in carrying out the 
rendition, the key role played by the British was summed up after the event, in as memo from Mark 
Allen, then Director of Counterterrorism at MI6, to his counterpart in Libya, Musa Kusa. Dated 18 
March, ten days after the operation, it explicitly congratulates Kusa on the ‘safe arrival’ of Belhadj 
and discusses securing direct British access to the detainee’s interrogations: 
 
Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu Abd Allah Sadiq [Belhadj]. This 
was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we 
have built over the years. I am so glad. I was grateful to you for helping the officer we sent out 
last week. Abu ‘Abd Allah’s information on the situation in this country is of urgent importance 
to us. Amusingly, we got a request from the Americans to channel requests for information from 
Abu ‘Abd Allah through the Americans. I have no intention of doing any such thing. The 
intelligence on Abu ‘Abd Allah was British. I know I did not pay for the air cargo. But I feel I have 
the right to deal with you direct on this and am very grateful for the help you are giving us (MI6 
2004b). 
 
This involvement was clearly not an exception: still-classified documents gathered by the Detainee 
Inquiry make clear that UK involvement in rendition was widespread. Although the Inquiry was 
closed before it was able to examine any case in detail, there were clearly numerous operations 
where Ministerial approval had been received, as well as ‘some instances of US renditions or post-
rendition liaison where the appropriateness of such involvement [by UK intelligence] may be open to 
question and/or where the involvement may have lacked ministerial approval’ (Detainee Inquiry 
2013: 34). 
 
We now also know a great deal more about the direct role UK intelligence agents played in sharing 
intelligence with the CIA, and the extent to which they were aware of the abuse of specific prisoners. 
The Detainee Inquiry identified around 200 cases in which UK involvement in, or knowledge of, 
mistreatment of detainees had been reported, either in documents received from the Government 
or from other information in the public domain (Detainee Inquiry 2013: 7). The Inquiry was clear that 
the material shows that UK intelligence officers were aware in numerous cases of ‘a range of 
treatment issues’ by liaison partners. These ‘issues’ included the use of hooding, stress positions, 
sleep deprivation, physical assaults, poor detention facilities and ‘questionable methods of transfer 
between detention sites.’ And not only were officers aware of the mistreatment that prisoners were 
subjected to, it appears that the torture was at times ‘supported by locally deployed officers’ 
(Detainee Inquiry 2013: 23). 
 
In one case which well illustrates the collusion, an MI5 officer was granted access to the British 
resident Binyam Mohamed in May 2002, during his period of secret detention and torture in 
Pakistan. Mohamed was detained in Pakistan in April 2002, and subjected to severe mistreatment 
while held incommunicado in an ISI interrogation centre. Interrogations was conducted by US 
agents, while the torture came from the Pakistanis. He was ‘hung up for a week by a leather strap 
around the wrists so he could only just stand,’ and beaten with a leather strap. At one point, a 
Pakistani agent loaded a semi-automatic gun in front of Mohamed: ‘He pressed it against my chest. 
He just stood there. I knew I was going to die. He stood like that for five minutes. I looked into his 
eyes, and I saw my own fear reflected there. I had time to think about it. Maybe he will pull the 
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trigger and I will not die, but be paralyzed. There was enough time to think the possibilities through’ 
(Reprieve 2008: 6). 
 
Before Mohamed was rendered for 18 months’ further secret detention and torture in Morocco in 
July 2002, the MI5 officer travelled to Pakistan to conduct his own interrogation. Crucially, before he 
left London, the Agency was clearly briefed on his mistreatment at the hands of the CIA. In a 
subsequent court case (Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs), it was revealed that the CIA had passed at least 42 documents to MI5 before its officer 
travelled to Pakistan. These documents made it clear that Mohamed had been interrogated by US 
authorities while in Pakistani custody, during which time he had been subjected to continuous sleep 
deprivation, shackling and threats of being ‘disappeared’. The documents also made clear that this 
mistreatment was ‘having a marked effect upon him and causing him significant mental stress and 
suffering’, and that as a consequence he was being kept under self-harm observation. The UK High 
Court, having reviewed the documents, concluded that ‘the reports provided to [MI5] made clear to 
anyone reading them that BM was being subjected to the treatment that we have described and the 
effect upon him of that intentional treatment’, and that this treatment ‘could readily be contended 
to be at the very least cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by the United States authorities.’ 
Indeed, the Court concluded, the mistreatment reported by the CIA to MI5, if it ‘had been 
administered on behalf of the United Kingdom, would clearly have been in breach of the 
undertakings given by the United Kingdom in 1972’ (UK Royal Courts of Justice 2010). 
 
Torture, Terror and Intelligence 
 
Within the orthodox literature on terrorism, there are those who tend to share the view that 
sometimes torture, while objectionable on many levels, may nevertheless be a necessary evil 
(Dershowitz 2001; 2004a; 2004b; Ramsey 2006). The so-called ‘ticking bomb scenario’ is often 
deployed to argue the case from a utilitarian perspective: they may well be instances, the argument 
goes, where the use of torture can prevent more harm than it causes. Where a prisoner is within 
custody of an authority, and is refusing to divulge what they know about other suspects, or 
forthcoming plots, it may be that the use of torture will produce actionable intelligence that 
otherwise would not be gained through more restrained methods.  
 
This was, indeed, the argument put forward by the CIA as it sought to both legitimise and justify its 
use of torture. The use of the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was saving lives, and anyone 
feeling queasy about the use of torture on these bad men should simply remember the carnage of 
9/11. The intelligence value of torture in the ‘war on terror’ has consistently been called into 
question, both by critical scholars (e.g., Blakeley 2011) and by official investigations. The CIA 
Inspector General, for example, found that interrogators frequently deviated from the guidelines set 
down by the Department of Justice, using methods than had not been sanctioned, and using those 
that had been sanctioned in more prolonged and harsher ways than had been permitted. He also 
raised serious doubts over the use of these techniques as methods for securing accurate 
intelligence, concluding that there was very little evidence of useful intelligence having been secured 
that had any bearing on any imminent terrorism plots (OIG 2004). The Senate investigation 
concurred with this assessment, finding that ‘the CIA’s use of its enhanced interrogation techniques 
was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees’, and 
that claims to the contrary ‘rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness’ (SSCI 2014: 2). In fact, 
many prisoners were incarcerated, incommunicado, for years on end, and tortured repeatedly, 
simply because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, were victims of erroneous so-called 
intelligence, or were sold for bounties by corrupt agents of third party states. Others may have in 
reality posed a threat to US interests, but nonetheless did not produce accurate intelligence under 
torture, instead telling interrogators what they thought they wanted to hear. 




Indeed, an analysis of how suspects were treated whilst in secret detention demonstrates that 
acquiring intelligence was not the only driver for the torture programme. Time and again, prisoners 
were treated to a regime of abuse unconnected to any attempts to secure intelligence. Installing a 
sense of fear and helplessness in those held by the CIA was an explicit objective of the programme, 
as achieved through a relentless control over prisoners’ bodies, environment and treatment. The 
secret nature of the detention was itself a form of torture, designed to install fear amongst those 
held within it and those on the outside witness to the enforced disappearances of their family and 
friends. It was, overall, a system of terror, perpetrated by the world’s most powerful state acting in 




As evidence that the US had condoned torture as part of the ‘war on terror’ emerged, a number of 
scholars that take a more critical approach to terrorism have paid close attention to the use of 
torture and its justifications (see for example Bellamy 2006; Blakeley 2007; 2011; Brecher this 
volume; MacMaster 2004). A number of critical scholars have also offered detailed analyses of the 
ways in which certain discourses around terror suspects have served to dehumanise specific 
individuals, thereby opening up the possibility that treating them inhumanely can be justified (see 
Jackson 2005; 2005b; 2007; Devetak 2005). This literature is extremely instructive for understanding 
how elites constructed particular discourses that lent themselves to both the overt and covert ways 
in which the human rights of terror suspects were being eroded.  
 
Our work has developed in parallel with these critiques, and has begun to scope out an alternative, 
complementary research agenda. Through The Rendition Project, we have begun to map the CIA’s 
rendition programme in granular detail, building large, robust datasets and utilising a range of 
investigative techniques to uncover the precise nature of the torture programme. Working closely 
with a range of investigators, we have been able to build a much more comprehensive picture of the 
workings of a major campaign of contemporary state terror. In short, we have been able to advance 
understanding of the RDI programme by mapping many of the human rights violations which took 
place. This is important, as we have been able to provide evidentiary support for those seeking 
redress through the international justice system (e.g., ECtHR 2012, paras 156-165; 2014, para 405-
15)).  
 
This research effort points a way to potential future directions for scholars working within Critical 
Terrorism Studies, which will complement the valuable focus on critiquing discursive 
representations. Detailed empirical research, necessitating the use of innovative investigative 
methods and collaboration with those outside the academy, can help us to understand how states 
and allied forces employ terrorism as a central policy tool, albeit whilst simultaneously parading 
their actions as legitimate counterterrorism efforts. This will be an important focus moving forward, 
and will help the field develop its role in uncovering and understanding how state terrorism 
manifests in the contemporary world. 
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